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The implementation of explicit quantitative in°ation targets elucidates the as-
sessment of credibility of future monetary policy. Here the explicit in°ation
target is time-varying and stochastic with asymmetric information. It is shown
that central bank independence promotes lower in°ation but not at the cost
of increased output variability. Marked political instability and instrument
dependence are detrimental to credibility, and impede monetary policy with
unchanged long term nominal interest rates. The marginal e®ect from less inde-
pendence on interest rate volatility is increasing in political instability. Strategic
delegation of an optimal in°ation target with a monetary reform eliminates the
in°ation bias. Empirical evidence substantiates the predictions when confronted
with cross-country OECD data.
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Many countries have recently designed and implemented explicit in°ation targets as
a means to attain price stability and to a®ect in°ation expectations and nominal con-
tracts. Predicted future monetary policy and forecasted in°ation relative to the path
of the in°ation target signal the extent to which the target is expected to be honored.
Credibility of monetary policy is thus manifested in potential divergence between the
quantitative in°ation target and the public's in°ation expectation embodied in the
standard and implied forward nominal yield curves. Whether economic and political
institutions may account for the (mis)trust in quantitative in°ation targets is exam-
ined in this paper.1
Casual observations give at hand that various types of political turmoil increase
nominal interest rates, in°ation expectations, and thus decrease con¯dence in the
in°ation target, for example when incumbents prior to elections tend to conduct looser
¯scal policy. At the same time central bank independence seems to work in the
opposite direction. Conspicuous nominal interest rate variation indicates that the
target is not fully credible. The conjecture is that lack of independence is a necessary
but not su±cient condition for high interest rate variability.
It is an equally justi¯able as often marketed argument that domestic institutions
must be adjusted to procure credibility of monetary policy and to deter permanently
high and volatile long term interest rates. Some case studies indicate that institu-
tional factors indeed may explain interest rate performance.2 It is observed that long
term interest rates are higher and more volatile in United Kingdom, Italy, Canada
and France, and lower in Switzerland, Japan, United States and Germany. Further-
more, high expected in°ation as manifested in the forward yield curve (except left
end-points) is observed in United Kingdom and Sweden, whilst the United States,
France and Germany display considerably lower interest rates. The interpretation is
that the former su®er from limited credibility due to their in°ation record and their
institutional status.
While the monetary policymaker generally has a prime concern about stable prices
and keeping in°ation down, he tries not to accomplish the price stability goal at all
costs but cares also about employment. The government assigns an objective func-
tion to the rational monetary policymaker who dislikes in°ation and output deviations
from their respective explicit or implicit targets, and whose interaction with the public
generates the economic outcome. The model relies originally on the work of Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).3 The subsequent positive and
normative literature has, however, implicitly regarded the in°ation target as a con-
1A theoretical background for in°ation targeting as well as the recent experiences for a subset of
OECD countries are presented in Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and Haldane (1995).
2The spot interest rate performance across countries is examined in Bernanke and Mishkin (1992)
and in Hardouvelis (1994), whilst Svensson (1994) exempli¯es the behavior of forward interest rates.
3Persson and Tabellini (1990) and Cukierman (1995) provide theoretical overviews, whereas
Cukierman (1996) surveys recent work on central bank independence and economic performance.
2stant with accompanied symmetric information. This is not an obvious or warranted
assumption since the targets can be revised from time to time. The postulation of a
constant target with non-biased information may be even less appropriate if the target
represents an intermediate money growth or exchange rate targeting regime.4
In practical policy the in°ation target is sometimes set by the central bank alone
and sometimes jointly with the government. The current paper allows the imple-
mented in°ation target to be partly determined by governmental interference. The
government's in°ation target follows a time-varying and stochastic process, which ef-
fectively relinquishes the typical but less realistic assumption of a time-invariant and
commonly known policy target. The stochastic in°ation target imposes extra infor-
mation asymmetries between agents. In particular, while being secret to the public as
it forms expectations the contemporaneous target is observed by the monetary poli-
cymaker when setting in°ation. Because information about policy targets tends to be
biased toward the policymaker away from the public this makes sense.
In°ation aversion is identi¯ed through the in°ation target level. An in°ation
target-conservative (-liberal) government is characterized by a low (high) 'political'
in°ation target level. Hence, a higher (lower) target is associated with lower (higher)
in°ation aversion in the political sphere. Many governmental turnovers due to altered
political majorities within the parliamentary session or in terms of a replacement of
the Prime Minister or party in o±ce after a general election indicate a politically un-
stable situation. Variations in the in°ation target thus gauges time-varying political
preferences concerning in°ation. Alesina and Roubini (1992), in accordance with the
partisan theory, let the in°ation target be higher for left wing parties relative to right
wing parties. Even though such an interpretation applies also to the present model
its primary purpose is to model political variation per se.
The implemented in°ation target will be some combination of the explicit politi-
cal target and the explicit, constant target of the central bank. To what extent the
central bank's claimed target will prevail is determined by the susceptibility to con-
tinuous external instructions of the central bank, its instrument independence.5 The
preferences of the in°ation target-conservative (-liberal) government is mapped onto
the central bank in accordance with the latter's instrument independence. A perfectly
instrument independent central bank is isolated from political in°ation target direc-
tives, implements its own preferred target, and chooses autonomously the best way
to achieve the ultimate objective. A less than fully instrument independent central
bank, however, takes political directives. The identi¯cation of (instrument) indepen-
dence, 'conservatism', and political instability via the assigned but stochastic explicit
in°ation target is non-conventional, since these variables typically (inspired by Rogo®
4Although price stability may at times be a far cry from in°ation stability, the paper interprets
the goal of stable prices as one of low in°ation (cf. Svensson (1996b)).
5The literature has recently become more speci¯c when it comes to describing central bank inde-
pendence. In Fischer (1995) it is decomposed into goal and instrument independence of the central
bank. In the present paper the ultimate goal is decided by the government for a longer term with
the eligible democratic in°uence making the bank goal dependent.
3(1985)) have been identi¯ed through the relative weight on in°ation stabilization.
The emphasis on the in°ation target is relevant for at least three reasons. First, the
approach is in consonance with observed implementations of quantitative in°ation tar-
gets. Secondly, empirical cross-country evidence establishes that more independence
and decreased political instability promote lower in°ation and lower in°ation variabil-
ity (cf. Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992)).
However, lower in°ation (due to independence) is not associated with increased output
variability. If anything, the opposite is observed (cf. Grilli et al. (1991) - 'almost like
having a free lunch', Eij±nger and Schaling (1993), Havrileski and Granato (1993)
and, in particular, Debelle and Fischer (1995) and Fischer (1995)). The ¯ndings
seem to refute the implication that lower in°ation must come at the cost of increased
output variability. By the identi¯cation of independence via the explicit in°ation tar-
get instead of the relative weight put on in°ation stabilization the inconsistency is
eliminated.6
A third reason for modeling in°ation targets is that it elucidates the evaluation of
credibility of future monetary policy. With an explicit target a direct comparison with
expected future in°ation embodies the extent to which it is believed. Expected fu-
ture in°ation is embodied in the term structure of interest rates. Potential divergence
between the endogenously generated nominal yield curve and the central bank's own
claimed in°ation target indicates future mistrust in the target. The paper examines
how long run interest rate volatility relates to independence and political instability.
Because of the generic in°ation bias under discretion, a normative solution is consid-
ered with strategic delegation from the government to the central bank of an optimal
in°ation target, given a time-varying governmental in°ation target with asymmetric
information.
Existing empirical work on institutions and economic outcome shows a weak re-
lation between independence and nominal interest rate volatility. Cukierman et al.
(1993) ¯nd a negative relation between legal central bank independence and variance
of real deposit interest rates, whereas the e®ect on the variability of nominal rates is
insigni¯cant. Cukierman and Webb (1995) show a positive relation between political
vulnerability of the central bank and the variance of real interest rates. Taking into
account the possibility that political instability also matters the paper contributes
with new empirical evidence on nominal interest rates and institutions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The model is presented in section 2.
Section 3 derives the equilibrium outcomes under commitment and discretion. Section
4 introduces the standard and forward yield curves. Section 5 tests some of the
theoretical predictions on cross-country OECD data and section 6 concludes. An
appendix contains some algebra, recapitulates variable de¯nitions and data sources,
and displays in tables the regression results.
6Alesina and Gatti (1995) provide a model with politically induced output variability, which in
this respect satis¯es the evidence.
42. The Model
2.1. A Time-Varying Political In°ation Target and Central Bank Instru-
ment Independence
The economy evolves over an in¯nite number of periods. The positive analysis assumes
that in each period t the central bank is given mandate by society (the government) to
conduct monetary policy according to an assigned loss function. The intertemporal,









where ± is the subjective discount factor, and E0 denotes conditional expectation at
the beginning of the in¯nite game.
For each period t Zt denotes the assigned and time-varying concave objective
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where ¼t ´ log[Pt=Pt¡1], yt is log output, and ¸ measures the relative weight placed
on output versus in°ation stabilization. It is conceivable to use output instead of
employment in the utility function as long as output is a linear function of employment.
The implemented explicit in°ation target is denoted ^ ¼t and the implicit output target
is denoted ^ yt: I assume that ^ yt is a constant, ^ y; which exceeds the positive natural
output level (for example due to labor market distortions). First-best equilibrium is
thus not attainable. The underlying preferences of society (the government) can be
stated as ¹ Zt = 1
2 ((¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t)2 + ¸(yt ¡ ^ yt)2); who has a di®erent in°ation target but the
same relative weight and output target.
The central bank is responsible for achieving the ultimate goal represented by the
assigned objective function (2.2). As a means the central bank has an intermedi-
ate time-dependent in°ation target which, however, is set by the government in each
period and regularly laid upon the central bank which adopts the instruction in ac-
cordance with its degree of instrument independence.7 A negative target innovation
is interpreted as interference from an in°ation target-conservative government regard-
ing how monetary policy should be conducted to reach the ultimate goal. Thus, the
in°ation target speci¯cation captures an exogenous political business cycle e®ect on
equilibrium policy, given a su±ciently dependent central bank.
To what extent governmental instructions translate into actual revisions of the
implemented explicit in°ation target is formalized through a linear mapping from the
government to the central bank,
7In the Rome Treaty (Article 107) it is established that independence of the central bank crucially
hinges on the prohibition to take instructions from its principal.
5^ ¼t = Ã¹ ¼t + (1 ¡ Ã)¼c
t
¼c
t = 0 8Ã 2 [0;1]: (2.3)
Hence, the implemented in°ation target is the weighted sum of the political target and
the central bank's own claimed target, where the latter is constant and normalized to
zero. The susceptibility of the central bank to governmental instructions is captured
by the time-invariant parameter Ã: As Ã approaches unity the central bank is less
instrument independent, whereas a low Ã indicates a high degree of independence.8
The government's aversion to in°ation varies across time, motivating a time-
varying and stochastic speci¯cation of the political in°ation target. The explicit target
of the government follows a mean reverting ¯rst-order autoregressive process with a
permanent and a transitory term, which imposes asymmetric information between the
policymaker and the public,
¹ ¼t = ¹ ¦ + °¹ ¼t¡1 + ´t: (2.4)
In (2.4) where ¹ ¦ > 0; ° 2 [0;1) for stationarity, and ´t is i.i.d. with zero mean
and variance ¾2
´. Because E[¹ ¼t] = E[¹ ¼t¡k] for any t and k; unconditional expecta-
tions are strictly positive. An in°ation target-conservative (-liberal) government is
characterized as more (less) in°ation averse, having a lower (higher) average or period
in°ation target. High volatility in the target identi¯es marked political instability, and
vice versa. The permanent term in (2.4) allows for a governmental in°ation target
innovation to persist over the political business cycle.
2.2. The Public
The public is characterized by the expectation-augmented Phillips-curve
ys;t = ¯(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t) + !t; ¯ > 0; (2.5)
where only unanticipated in°ation has real e®ects, and where !t denotes an i.i.d.
supply shock in period t with zero mean and variance ¾2
!: The public, while setting
nominal wages, internalizes the policymaker's behavior and since it cares about real




t = Et¡1¼t; (2.6)
8Notice that central bankindependence is treated as an exogenous variable. Cukierman, Webb and
Neyapti (1992) discuss the possibility of endogenous central bank laws responding to, for instance,
high in°ation. However, endogenous independence, they argue, applies potentially to actual (not
legal) independence such as the turnover rate of the central bank governor.
9By assuming that the production function is of Cobb-Douglas type, that the ¯rm hires labor
until marginal product equals real wage, and that labor supply is increasing in real wage, it is indeed
conceivable to derive an aggregate supply function consistent with (2.5).
6where Et¡1 denotes expectations as of period t ¡ 1 conditional on all information
available at that time, and ¼e
t denotes subjective expectations hold by the public. The
structural model is extended by an aggregate demand function, which is decreasing in
the one period ex ante real interest rate,
yd;t = ¡®(it ¡ Et¼t+1) + ²t; ® > 0; (2.7)
where ²t is i.i.d. with zero mean and variance ¾2
². On the right hand side it ´ it;t+1
8t de¯nes the one period (short term) nominal interest rate and Et¼t+1 denotes the
period t expected in°ation rate between t and t + 1.10
Spot nominal interest rates with di®erent times to maturity and forward interest
rates with various forecast horizons embody expectations of the public about future
monetary policy and future expected in°ation. Thus, the introduction of the term
structure of interest rates exhibits whether and to what extent the in°ation target is
expected to be honored. The standard yield curve displays bond yields to maturity
contingent on time to maturity and displays time averages of expected future short
term interest rates. The forward yield curve expresses expected future short term
interest rates at a speci¯c date discarding what has happened up to that point in
time. Taking the time averages of the T ¡ t expected one-period spot interest rates
constitutes the standard yield curve for zero-coupon bonds which is a representation






Etij;j+1 + »t;T; (2.8)
where it;T denotes the T ¡t term spot interest rate and »t;T a term premium for holding
a long bond.







¡ 1 8t < t
0 < T; (2.9)
where t; t0; and T denote trade date, settlement date, and maturity date, respectively.11
On the right hand side, it;T denotes the spot rate that carries interest between period
t and T; and it;t0 the spot rate that carries interest between t and t0. Hence, to sell (in
blanco) at time t a bond that carries interest it;t0 until t0 and buy immediately at time
t a bond with interest it;T which matures in T > t0; is on an arbitrage-free market
identically equal to a period t purchase of a forward contract which is payed for in t0
10Cf. the extention in Rogo® (1985). The present model excludes any real balance e®ects.
11The implied forward yield curve refers to non-existing forward contracts with settlements beyond
one year. Schiller (1990) examines in detail the term structure of interest rates and various term
premia. Svensson (1994) describes how the forward and standard yield curves can be interpreted for
monetary policy purposes.
7and carries interest between t0 and T: The forward interest rate can thus be viewed as
the public's predicted future spot interest rate.
The non-arbitrage condition (2.9) implies that any forward contract can be ¯nanced
by a spot contract at the settlement date. The di®erence between the certain forward
interest rate and the uncertain spot rate at time t0 is the expected excess return on
such a transaction, which constitutes the nominal forward term premium »t;t0;T ´
ft;t0;T ¡ Etit0;T with forecast horizon t0 ¡ t.
In particular, for any forecast horizon ¿; it follows that the forward term premium
is de¯ned by
»t;t+¿;t+¿+1 ´ ft;t+¿;t+¿+1 ¡ Etit+¿;t+¿+1 8¿ ¸ 0; (2.10)
where ft;t+¿;t+¿+1 denotes the forward interest rate traded in period t; settled in period
t+¿; and maturing one period after settlement. Henceforth it is assumed that investors
are risk neutral. With zero expected excess return on a forward contract, the forward
rate exactly gauges the period t expected future spot rate. The T ¡ t term spot




Precommitment to a state-contingent optimal rule is hard to enforce and probably
infeasible in real life. Still the solution is considered here as a benchmark, serving as an
informative reference point. The economy evolves over an in¯nite number of periods
and within each period the timing under commitment is displayed in Figure 3.1.
Assume that the policymaker ¯rst credibly announces a state contingent strategy for
in°ation. The public sets nominal wages contingent on the strategy and on period t¡1
information but ignorant of the innovations º0
t = (´t !t ²t). Finally, the policymaker
sets in°ation. The in°ation target is thus subject to asymmetric information.
time
   ( ) p n               p
e                     np                   p
Figure 3.1. Timing of events under commitment.
8The ex ante commitment implies that the central bank internalizes into its opti-
mization problem the e®ects of the decision rule on the public's expectations. Fol-
lowing Persson and Tabellini (1994), the policymaker optimizes directly over in°ation
and expected in°ation, where in°ation may depend on current innovations but ex-
pected in°ation depends only on lagged innovations (lagged state variable). In the
subgame perfect equilibrium the policymaker moves ¯rst and can control the public's
expectations subject to the constraint that these expectations are rational.
The dynamic in°ation target level implies potential intertemporal links between
in°ation and the target. The optimal rule under commitment is thus obtained by
considering the forward-looking objective function (2.1), given the inherited in°ation
target. The in¯nite sum of expected loss functions is equivalently stated as a Bell-
man equation with the discounted value function Z(¹ ¼t) entering the decision problem,
which means that potential e®ects from the contemporaneous target on future optimal
in°ation is internalized (cf. Lockwood et al. (1995)).
The optimal rule is then the solution to the problem
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The ¯rst-order conditions with respect to ¼t when expectations are taken as ¯xed, and
¼e
t become
(¼t ¡ Ã¹ ¼t) + ¯¸(¯(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t) + !t ¡ ^ y) + ¹t¡1 = 0 (3.3)
¡Et¡1[¯¸(¯(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t) + !t ¡ ^ y) + ¹t¡1] = 0 (3.4)
where ¹t¡1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the rational expectations con-
straint. In (3.3) the marginal current cost of increase in in°ation plus the marginal
current cost from increase in output must be equal to the marginal cost of expected
in°ation in (3.4). Eliminating ¹t¡1 and taking conditional expectations at t ¡ 1 with
(2.6) yields
Et¡1¼t = Ã(¹ ¦ + °¹ ¼t¡1): (3.5)
Inserting (3.5) into the ¯rst-order conditions yields the ex ante optimal decision rule
for in°ation where nominal wages are optimal for the public given the policy rule, and
the rule is optimal for the policymaker given the behavior of the public,
¼t = Ã(¹ ¦ + °¹ ¼t¡1) +
1
1 + ¯2¸
(Ã´t ¡ ¯¸!t): (3.6)
An in°ation target-conservative government generates lower in°ation in the current
and the subsequent period, given imperfect instrument independence. Because the
9public is ignorant about the contemporaneous in°ation target, a persistent e®ect on




(¯Ã´t + !t); (3.7)
where (2.5), (3.5), and (3.6) are used.
(3.6) encompasses both predetermined and unexpected in°ation. The former de-
pends on lagged innovations and may not stabilize shocks to the economy whereas
the latter may. A negative (positive) realization of the supply shock lowers (raises)
output and is optimally stabilized by the policymaker through unanticipated in°ation
(de°ation). It is always best for the bank to fully o®set the e®ects on in°ation and
output from a demand shock. The intuition is that a demand shock (unlike a supply
ditto) proportionally a®ects both in°ation and output.





which is decreasing in independence Ã, increasing in 'conservatism' ¹ ¦; and increasing
in persistence °: Average output, though, does not depend on independence, whereas
in°ation and output variability decrease in independence. Hence, the implication is
that lower in°ation (and in°ation variability) has no real adverse e®ects.




!t); via (2.6), (2.5) and (2.7). Rational expectations imply that the optimal decision
rule in (3.6) is indeed expected by the public, and that the rule is the same for all
periods. Substituting for the expectation terms by using (3.5) and its one period lead
yields a solution in terms of predetermined variables. The implied equilibrium short
term interest rate consistent with the optimal decision rule for in°ation is
it = (1 + °)Ã¹ ¦ + Ã°
2¹ ¼t¡1 + kºt; (3.9)
where º0







note the composite shock and the associated policy vector. A negative supply shock
lowers output and is therefore stabilized through an unanticipated decrease in the en-
dogenous short term interest rate. The coe±cient 1
® fully o®sets demand shock e®ects
on output. Supply and demand shocks are just transitory, whereas a governmental
change of the in°ation target may have a permanent e®ect on the interest rate.
Because the optimization problem is linear-quadratic the indirect utility function
Z(¹ ¼t¡1) must be quadratic and consequently we can write the discounted present value
12In contrast, persistence would vanish if the time-varying in°ation target was common knowledge
in t. Optimal in°ation would be fully a®ected by the current implemented target. The paper sticks
to the (more plausible) informational structure where the period t target is not publicly known when
expectations are formed.
10of expected future losses conditioned on the state variable ¹ ¼t¡1 as






where µi, i = 0;1;2 are unknown coe±cients to be determined. The optimal discounted
value of the central bank will be decreasing in independence and increasing in political
instability. With perfect instrument independence political instability is fully removed
and the optimal loss minimized. The optimal value of (2.1) of society will depend on
independence such that the intertemporal discounted loss is minimized when Ã = 1;
that is, with no independence (cf. Appendix A.1).
3.2. Discretion
It is a general view that discretion with an 'unconstrained' policymaker prevails in
reality. I therefore consider a more realistic, yet highly stylized context without pre-
commitment technology. The timing is given in Figure 3.2 where the public sets
nominal wages without knowing the in°ation target. The policymaker implements
optimal policy with private information about innovations in the economy.
time
    p
e                             n   p                             p
Figure 3.2. Timing of events under discretion.
The central bank solves the problem
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¸
; (3.11)
subject to (2.5), (2.4) and (2.3), given expected in°ation ¼e
t: That is, in°ation is set
after the innovations have been realized and observed. Taking the ¯rst-order condition
yields
(¼t ¡ Ã°¹ ¼t¡1 ¡ Ã´t) + ¯¸(¯(¼t ¡ ¼
e
t) + !t ¡ ^ y) = 0; (3.12)
where the cost of increased in°ation expectations does not enter. The expectation at
t ¡ 1 of equation (3.12) is
Et¡1¼t ¡ ¯¸^ y ¡ Ã°¹ ¼t¡1 = 0 (3.13)
11where equation (2.6) is used. Substituting equation (3.13) into (3.12) when expec-
tations are formed rationally yields the ex post optimal decision rule for in°ation
according to
¼t = ¯¸^ y + Ã(¹ ¦ + °¹ ¼t¡1) +
1
1 + ¯2¸
(Ã´t ¡ ¯¸!t); (3.14)
whereas equilibrium output is the same as under commitment. In this Nash equilib-
rium nominal wages are a best reply to the decision rule, and the decision rule is a
best reply to nominal wages, irrespective of the realized shocks.
The variance of in°ation and output, and average output remain second-best, while
average in°ation exceeds the commitment outcome with the constant and positive
in°ation bias. The in°ation bias arises because of the binding incentive compatibility
constraint, given too diligent an output target. While the policymaker acts ex post to
expectations, the policy rule must be such that there exist no incentives to deviate,
and the marginal loss of higher in°ation is truly balanced in equilibrium by a marginal
gain of higher output. The central bank thus aims at ¯rst-best optimum, performs
worse than under commitment where the policymaker controls expectations via its
rule, and is stuck in a third-best equilibrium.
The implied equilibrium short term interest rate becomes
it = ¯¸^ y + (1 + °)Ã¹ ¦ + Ã°
2¹ ¼t¡1 + kºt: (3.15)
A social welfare comparison implies that discretion is Pareto-de¯cient to commitment.






The welfare inconsistency is thus una®ected by political in°ation target instability
and central bank independence.
3.3. Strategic Delegation of a Time-Invariant In°ation Target
Despite the infeasibility of precommitment to a fully state-contingent rule, the in°ation
bias under discretion can be mitigated through a proper design of the central bank's
objective. This can remove the discrepancy between optimal in°ation ex ante (before
expected in°ation is formed) and optimal in°ation ex post.13 Such a normative result
is suggested in this section via a strategic delegation of monetary policy in terms of the
13The most in°uential contributions in this strand of literature are provided by Rogo® (1985)
(conservative central bank), Lohmann (1992) (escape clauses), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and
Walsh (1995) (linear in°ation contract), and Svensson (1996a) (explicit optimal in°ation target).
The ¯rst two normative suggestions can achieve equilibria better than under discretion but worse
than under commitment, whereas the latter three can yield exactly the equilibrium consistent with
the precommitment solution.
McCallum (1995) considers the in°ationary bias to be a fallacy. Even in absence of commitments
it is not necessary, he argues, that a central bank behaves in a way that creates an in°ation bias.
12explicit time-varying in°ation target (¸ and ^ y remain unaltered) from the government
to the, subsequently, fully instrument independent central bank. The delegation is
characterized by two constituent bodies and implemented in two steps.
First, the optimal in°ation target is determined through a governmental strategic
assignment of a modi¯ed period loss function to the central bank, where ¹ ¼t is replaced
by the strategically delegated target ¹ ¼¤
t; which conceivably di®ers from the one pre-
ferred by society. Hence, in the ¯rst step the optimization problem is solved subject





¯¸!t). By letting the delegation occur in the outset of the game - beginning of period
t = 1 - it can be shown that the optimal in°ation target must ful¯ll
¹ ¼
¤ = ¹ ¼0 ¡
¯¸^ y
°
8° 2 (0;1) (3.17)
under the assumption that the expected target innovation in period 1 is zero when the
delegation is done, and where ¹ ¼0 is the exogenously ¯xed in°ation target in period 0:
By strategically selecting a su±ciently low, constant in°ation target the second-best
equilibrium is achieved and the in°ation bias made void.
Secondly, a monetary reform is carried out so as to warrant the appropriate legisla-
tive support. This reform should be associated with a certain constitutional arrange-
ment (a law) which makes it too costly for the government to renege. The monetary
constitutional reform, sanctioned in the parliament, essentially makes the central bank
fully instrument independent from external instructions for all future periods,
Ã = 0; (3.18)
which consequently disquali¯es the 'automatic' generation of the central bank in°ation
target in (2.3). The governmental in°ation target still evolves according to (2.4),
though.14 A per-period renegotiation on the optimal in°ation target is prevented since
the target turns out to be time-invariant. Accordingly the strategic delegation does
not reoccur in subsequent periods of the game.15 Moreover, being directly succeeded
However, without access to a commitment technology this would not be an equilibrium, given the
maintained assumption of a distorted labor market. If there is a reputation mechanism at work
a®ecting central bank behavior, it is not clear why the optimal outcome would be the unique equi-
librium unless the private sector's trigger strategies are somehow coordinated. A second argument
is that instead of removing the in°ation bias, strategic delegation relocates the incentive to renege
from the central bank to the government. In the present model this objection is explicitly taken into
account.
14In the context of strategic delegation of optimal in°ation targets it would (in future research) be
interesting to examine the optimal term of o±ce of the central bank governor, given a time-varying
in°ation target.
15A time-dependent counterpart to (3.17) is given by ¹ ¼¤
t = ¹ ¼t¡
¯¸^ y
° ; which thus takes the form of a
yearly assignment to the central bank to follow a 'simple' rule, which is not fully state-contingent but
merely a function of the actual time-varying target and the constant in°ation bias. Such a delegation
rule is not as immune to renegotiations as the 'once and for all-delegation' in (3.17), though. But it
would be optimal in each period.
13by a monetary reform that makes the central bank fully instrument independent for
the rest of the in¯nite game, the delegation is supposed to have su±cient legislative
support eliminating ex post incentives to renege.
4. Institutions and Expected Future Monetary Policy
4.1. The Forward Yield Curve
The endogenous forward yield curve embodies the public's expected future in°ation.
Because it reveals to what extent the claimed constant target of the central bank
is believed (given no strategic delegation) it indicates how credible future monetary
policy is. Substituting (3.15) into de¯nition (2.10) for some arbitrary forecast horizon ¿
(the time elapsing between the trade and settlement dates) yields the state-dependent
forward interest rate,




jÃ¹ ¦ + Ã°
¿+1¹ ¼t; 8¿ > 0; (4.1)
where the instantaneous forward rate ft;t is suppressed and ft;t+¿ ´ ft;t+¿;t+¿+1.
Changes in the actual central bank in°ation target is interpreted as exogenous in-








Figure 4.1. The forward yield curve in period t.
The time path of the forward yield curve can according to (4.1) be delineated
as in Figure 4.1. The upper curve constitutes the implied forward yield curve with
16Discretion imposes a binding 'credibility constraint' on the policymaker. The in°ation bias
emerges under discretion because optimal in°ation ex ante is not credible ex post. The credibility
problem also gives rise to excessively high in°ation expectations and therefore a wedge between the
explicit in°ation target and the yield curve, that is, the announced in°ation target is not expected
to be honored. If the positive analysis encompasses an explicit time-varying output target and a
constant in°ation target, I believe (left for future research) any discretionary in°ation bias would
vanish when the announced in°ation target is fully believed, for example as a result of perfect
instrument independence of the central bank.
14trade date t plotted against t + ¿; given ¹ ¼t >
1
1¡° ¹ ¦. The instantaneous forward
rate is hit by a positive composite shock kºt. The curve declines geometrically from
ft;t+1 = ¯¸^ y+(1+°)Ã¹ ¦+Ã°2¹ ¼t toward its long run asymptote lim¿!1 ft;t+¿ ´ f1 =
¯¸^ y+ 1
1¡°Ã¹ ¦: The vertical distance between the displayed period t forward yield curve
and some imaginary (not displayed) period t+s curve would for any forecast horizon
¿ > s measure the change in in°ation expectations between period t and t+s.17 The
forward curve embodies the extent to which the central bank's zero in°ation target is
believed.
Proposition 4.1. [i] An in°ation target-conservative (-liberal) government implies,
for any forecast horizon, lower (higher) forward interest rates, given an imperfectly
independent central bank. [ii] The long run value of the forward rate is decreasing
in independence and conservatism of the government. [iii] The forward yield curve,
geometrically and monotonically approaching its asymptote, slopes down(up)wards
when the target is positive (negative). [iv] Past target innovations persist in¯nitely at
a continuously declining rate. [v] Less instrument independence and increased political
instability promote mistrust in the central bank's claimed zero in°ation target. [vi]
Forward rate volatility is increasing in in°ation target persistence.
Proof. [i] The result follows from (4.1) if and only if Ã > 0. With Ã equal to
zero, the term structure is represented by a trivial horizontal forward yield curve since
ft;t+¿+1 = ft;t+¿ 8¿: [ii] The statements are proved by taking the partial derivatives
of lim¿!1 ft;t+¿ w.r.t. Ã and ¹ ¦: [iii] The slope of the forward yield curve in period t
becomes
ft;t+¿+1 ¡ ft;t+¿ = °
¿+1Ã¹ ¦ + Ã°
¿+1(° ¡ 1)¹ ¼t 7 0 if ¹ ¼t ? 0; ¿ ¸ 1:
[iv] The forward interest rate can be rewritten as ft;t+¿ = ¯¸^ y +
P1
s=0Ã°s+¿+1´t¡s
for each ¿ ¸ 1; where the second term conveys that all past realizations decreasingly







where by inspection the partial derivatives w.r.t. to Ã and ¾2
´ verify the statements.
[vi]
@Var[ft;t+¿]
@° > 0 if Ã > 0. ¤
17If the forward yield curve with trade date t+4; say, lies above the period t curve in future period
t+6; the vertical distance ft+4;t+6¡ft;t+6 = Ã°3 P3
s=0 °s´t+4¡s > 0 expresses the increase between t
and t+4 in expected t+6 in°ation. However, as ° approaches zero this di®erence becomes negligible.
If ¹ ¼t < 1
1¡° ¹ ¦ the lower curve applies.
154.2. The Standard Yield Curve
Whereas the forward interest rate conveys information for some variable at a speci¯c
future point in time, the spot interest rate measures the time average of a variable
between the trade date and the maturity date. The long, T ¡ t term spot interest
rate is obtained by substituting (4.1) into (2.10) and (2.8) for ¿ = 0;1;::::;T ¡ t ¡ 1;
assuming zero expected excess return on a forward contract. Its one period lead is
it+1;T = ¯¸^ y +
1







T¡t¡2)Ã¹ ¼t + hºt+1
¶
; (4.2)
with h = [ h1 h2 h3 ] = [ Ã(
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® ] and K > 0
(intermediate steps in Appendix A.2). The endogenous standard yield curve intuitively
responds to changes in the political in°ation target, whose impact is decreasing in the
forecast horizon. Moreover, interest rates can be permanently lowered when switching
from an in°ation target-liberal to an in°ation target-conservative regime if the central
bank is su±ciently dependent and ° is not too small.
The standard yield curve geometrically decreases in time to maturity, given that the
target does not follow a random walk. In Figure 4.1 the yield curve would run parallel
with and lie outside the forward yield curve, approaching their common horizontal
asymptote over the forecast horizon. By repeated substitution it is clear that the
T ¡ t term interest rate is increasing in past in°ation target innovations although
at a continuously declining magnitude. The declining e®ect follows because when T
grows, inverted time to maturity in (4.2) decreases faster than the second term within
parenthesis increases.
Long run (average) credibility of the central bank in°ation target is consequently
embodied in the wedge between average long term nominal interest rate and the zero
target. The unconditional expectation of the wedge is
E[it+1;T] = ¯¸^ y +
1






Ã¹ ¦ > 0 (4.3)
which is decreasing in independence and increasing in conservatism of the government.
Moreover, volatility in the yield curve indicates lack of credibility with respect to fu-
ture monetary policy. Any inconsistency between future nominal interest rates and
the central bank target genuinely constitutes lack of credibility. The conditional vari-
ance in the long term interest rate (expected future variability) and its unconditional
counterpart are given by
Vart[it+1;T] =
1
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: I use the identifying assumption that the innova-
tions are orthogonal to each other, E[´t´s] = E[´t!t] = E[´t²t] = E[²t!t] = 0 8t 6= s
(details in Appendix A.3). While depending on time to maturity, the variance is
indeed time-invariant such that no 'volatility bias' arises.
Moreover, an appropriate institutional structure facilitates monetary policy with-
out a®ecting in°ation expectations. Low long versus short term interest rate volatility
characterizes high credibility with respect to monetary policy. Conversely, low short
rate volatility combined with a persistently high long rate volatility indicates lack of
credibility. Relative volatility in nominal interest rates, de¯ned in the model as the
(A.9) to (4.5) ratio, is clearly in°uenced by institutional factors in the form of central
bank independence and political instability. The theoretical predictions for the T ¡ t
term interest rate and its properties are stated in Proposition 4.2. and hold for all
maturity dates. In Section 5 they are confronted with empirical data.
Proposition 4.2. [i] Interest rate variability is non-decreasing in political instability,
given less than full central bank independence. [ii] Interest rate variability is non-
increasing in independence. [iii] The marginal e®ect from less independence on interest
rate volatility is higher with more political instability. Imperfect independence is a
necessary but not su±cient condition for conspicuous interest rate variability. With a
fully ¯rm in°ation target independence becomes irrelevant. [iv] Interest rate volatility
is, at least for some parameter values, intuitively increasing in persistence of the
in°ation target. In contrast, with symmetric information about the target, volatility
would be unambiguously increasing in persistence. [v] Relative volatility in interest
rates is increasing in central bank independence. That is, less independence intuitively
raises long rates more than short rates. [vi] Relative volatility in interest rates is
decreasing in political instability. That is, increased political instability raises long
rates more than short rates.
Proof. [i] The statement applies since the partial derivative of (4.5) w.r.t. ¾2
´ is
positive for all Ã ¸ 0 and ° 2 [0;1): [ii] The derivative w.r.t. Ã is non-negative for all
° 2 [0;1). [iii] The cross-derivative w.r.t. Ã and ¾2
´ is positive. [iv] For large (small)
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1¡°(1 ¡ °T¡t¡2) > 1 when T > t and ° < 1: [vi] Similar to proof of [v]. ¤
5. Empirical Evidence
In this section the predictions in Proposition 4.2. are confronted with data for a subset
of OECD countries over a period ranging from the early 1960s to 1989. The empiri-
cal association between interest rate variability and economic-political institutions in
terms of political instability and central bank independence is examined. Taking the
model literally the time-invariant key regression equation for country j becomes




´;j + ej (5.1)
where the dependent variable is the long term interest rate volatility in (4.5) and
Ã2
j¾2
´;j is the interacting variable capturing squared central bank independence and
political instability for country j.







The residual is inherently orthogonal to the regressors, since the disturbance terms
within the model are independently distributed. The coe±cient ½1 represents the coef-
¯cient associated with the interaction term, whilst the constant ½0 expresses the mean










sequently, the model implies that the constant is non-negative as well as decreasing in
time to maturity.
The theoretical predictions are quite robust to alternative assumptions made about,
for example, the in°ation target process and the susceptibility parameter Ã.18 Some
supplementary speci¯cations are tested since they meet the basic idea of the paper.
Moreover, they reveal additional information about the validity of the model as it
stands, and they relate to similar empirical work which neglects potential impact
from political instability.19
18If, say, the degree of independence is characterized by EtÃt+k = Ãt 8k > 0 so that Ãt+k =
Ãt + Àt+k; Àt+k is standard normal, cumbersome and unreported calculation shows that the main
implications prevail. In addition, (5.1) will be augmented with the separate e®ect from political
instability.
19During the sample period many countries have merely had implicit in°ation targets and instead
explicit exchange rate targets. Therefore variability in nominal interest rates may at times partly
account for devaluation expectations rather than doubts concerning the achievement of the in°ation
target.
185.1. The Data and The Assessments of Regressors
The country sample and the period examined are restricted by the availability of
monthly data on short and long term interest rate data (cf. Appendix A.5). The
empirical analysis encompasses only industrial countries, since interest rate data in
developing countries is poorer and less trustworthy. Furthermore (but non-binding),
only democracies within the industrial countries are examined, such that the political
instability proxy makes sense. The variance of the long and short term interest rates
is based on monthly observations on nominal interest rate series with three months
to maturity (money market interest rates) and ¯ve years to maturity and beyond
(bond yields), respectively. While the frequency is months (not quarters or years) the
variance presumably contains more relevant information.
The main source for bond yields and treasury bills are the Bank of International
Settlements (cf. Appendix A.4). Analysis of interest rate data indicates that in
some periods (preferably in the 1960s) trade has been limited which may impair the
reliability and quality of the dependent variable. In the regressions the OECD country
sample varies with the sample period due to limited availability of interest rate series.
The countries considered are ranked with respect to their legal central bank inde-
pendence index CBI, provided in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992). The indepen-
dence proxy is coded using information about (i) the appointment, the term of o±ce,
and the dismissal of the governor, (ii) the policy formulation procedure: who formu-
lates monetary policy and the extent to which the central bank takes governmental
instructions, (iii) the implementation of the price stability goal, and (iv) limitations
on lending. Their actual CBI-index based on the turnover rate of the central bank
governor TOR is also considered.
In the model the degree of political instability too drives the results. Three ad-
mittedly rough assessments of political instability based on raw data in Lane et al.
(1991) are constructed. The ¯rst proxy PPCH gauges transitions in the political
process where a governmental turnover results in a new party and Prime Minister
entering o±ce. Secondly, PCH counts the number of governmental shifts where the
incumbent Prime Minister is replaced although the same party may remain in power.
Thirdly, the number of governmental shifts regardless the election outcome GCH is
used, which thus captures changes in the cabinet irrespective of whether the Prime
minister leaves o±ce or not. Each measure of governmental change constitutes a ratio
de¯ned by the relevant number of transitions to the number of years in the sample
period. The interaction term is captured by a product-dummy variable.
Cukierman and Webb (1995) create an index for political vulnerability of the cen-
tral bank PVU, which represents an extension of the actual turnover rate and is de¯ned
as the fraction of political transitions followed within six months by a replacement of
the central bank governor. PVU assesses a very speci¯c type of instability, namely
governmental turnovers together with turnover of the central bank governor. However,
the subservience of the central bank may be in°uenced by political turbulence in other
ways. For example, via the price stability goal or the policy formulation procedure,
19without the drastic dismissal of the governor. To be precise, the content of the model
is rather that political instability per se together with a broader measure of indepen-
dence a®ect economic outcome. In the regressions the main focus is therefore on legal
independence and the political instability proxy.
The institutional variables are considered as exogenous variables because concepts
such as independence and political instability should be thought of as changing slowly
over time. A revision of legal independence of the central bank manifestly occurs quite
seldom (see the CBI-indexation in Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti). Likewise political
instability is an assessment which most suitably is measured over a longer period.
Consequently the sample periods are fairly long.20 In the pooled regressions I let the
sub-periods be determined by the indexation of legal independence. The grouping of
cross-country data in sub-periods possibly better seizes the information of institutional
changes that have occurred over time, as well as it entails additional degrees of freedom
in the cross-country regressions. To control for potentially country speci¯c variables
which are not explicitly taken into account in the regression equations (for example
target persistence), I complement by allowing for country speci¯c ¯xed e®ects.
5.2. The Results
By testing the predicted association between nominal interest rate volatility and cen-
tral bank independence together with political instability in a cross-country perspec-
tive the paper contributes with new results for the industrial countries. In the em-
pirical literature on institutions and economic outcome there is (to my knowledge)
only one attempt to uncover institutional e®ects on nominal interest rates. Using CBI
and TOR as regressors (separately and simultaneously), Cukierman et al. (1993) run
cross-section regressions over the period 1978 to 1989 for industrial and developing
countries. CBI is insigni¯cant whilst TOR signi¯cantly a®ects bond yield volatility in
the expected way.21 The present model, however, suggests that the natural regression
equation comprises the interaction between squared legal independence and the assess-
ment for political instability. The Lagrange multiplier test (LM test) introduced by
Breuch and Pagan (1980) frequently rejects the null hypothesis of no contemporaneous
cross-country correlation (a diagonal covariance matrix) in the regressions. The LM
test furthermore rejects the homoscedasticity hypothesis across countries. To avoid
ine±ciency of point estimates and biasedness of the estimated covariance matrix, the
results are based on an asymptotically appropriate estimator of the covariance matrix
adjusted for both heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation (cf. White (1980)
20For yearly pooled cross-section and time-series regressions a binary proxy was used for each
measure of political instability, being unity in years of governmental switch and zero otherwise. To
control for more than one switch in a single year the ¯rst proxy is completed with up to two additional
binary proxies. The rather promising results are not reported, though.
21The association between independence and real interest rate variability is tested in Alesina and
Summers (1993), Cukierman et al. (1993) and Cukierman and Webb (1995), who all ¯nd a negative
but not always signi¯cant relationship.
20and Greene (1993)).
In Tables (A.1)-(A.3) the regression results of bond yield variability on the relevant
variables between 1966-89 including 17 countries are displayed. In each table, column
[1] corresponds to the key regression equation (5.1) whereas [3] and [4] by steps add
GCH and CBI2. Column [2] reports the separate e®ects from GCH and CBI2, respec-
tively. The interacting e®ect between independence and political instability enters
signi¯cantly with the predicted negative sign in speci¯cation [1], Table (A.1). The
interpretation is that bond yield volatility increases more from less independence in
countries with more political instability than in countries with less political instabil-
ity (here seized by governmental shifts regardless of electorate outcome). The null
hypothesis of no association is clearly rejected. In accordance with the model the
constant too enters signi¯cantly with the correct positive sign. Column [3] adds GCH
which enters signi¯cantly with the predicted positive sign. At the same time the in-
teraction proxy remains signi¯cant. When CBI2 is added too it enters signi¯cantly,
whilst the e®ects from the former two variables dissipate. Discarding the interacting
variable, CBI2 and GCH come in signi¯cantly with the right signs. The overall ¯t is
17 percent in the main regression and in the alternative speci¯cations it lies in the
interval between 40 and 44 percent.
Tables (A.2) and (A.3) report pooled regressions. The encouraging results prevail.
The impact from the interaction term is even more tangible, being signi¯cant at the 1
percent level. The alternative speci¯cations show about the same results as previously.
However, the overall ¯t is generally lower. One explanation is that with shorter sub-
periods the di®erence in long term interest rate volatility across countries probably
dilutes somewhat. Country speci¯c dummy variables intend to capture non-modelled
within country variations like, for example, an asymmetric mean reversion parameter
of the in°ation target. The ¯xed e®ect model enhances the overall ¯t at the same time
as many of the variables come in insigni¯cantly (yet with the predicted signs). This
may indicate that some of the parameters in the model are indeed country speci¯c.
To examine the robustness of the results with respect to the sample period I proceed
by excluding the 1960s. In Table (A.4) the interaction proxy still enters correctly and
signi¯cantly at the 5 percent level in column [1]. The addition of GCH in [3] implies
that both political instability and its interaction with CBI2 enter signi¯cantly with
their predicted positive and negative signs. That is, the marginal e®ect from less
independence on bond yield volatility increases with political instability. In column
[4], though, all regressors but CBI2 are insigni¯cant. Apparently, the interaction term
explains only 12 percent of the variation in bond yield volatility, but in speci¯cations
[2]-[4] R2 lies in the neighborhood of 35 percent.
By extending the period to 1960-89 two countries are lost. The qualitative results
(not reported) prevail with one notable exception; the interaction term becomes in-
signi¯cant in regression [1]. Otherwise, both CBI2 and GCH have stark signi¯cant
e®ects. For the limited sample period covering merely the 1980s the interaction term
is again insigni¯cant, although with the right sign. Political instability has a pro-
21nounced (1 percent level) predicted impact on bond yield volatility, while CBI2 enters
insigni¯cantly. That is, during the 1980s the null hypothesis that the average bond
yield volatility does not di®er between countries with relatively independent central
banks and countries with relatively dependent central banks cannot be rejected.
Points on the left-end of the yield curve are represented by treasury bills with
three months to maturity. Table (A.5) displays a signi¯cant negative interacting im-
pact on the average treasury bill volatility, political instability is always insigni¯cant,
whereas independence always enters signi¯cantly with the right sign. By means of
pooled regressions the number of observations increases to thirty-six. The unreported
regressions give an insigni¯cant interaction term (always with a negative sign though),
whereas GCH becomes markedly signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. For the (unreported)
semi-long period 1972-89 (¯fteen countries) the interacting e®ect is signi¯cant at 5
percent. GCH has a signi¯cant impact whereas CBI2 has not.
The conclusions are fairly robust with respect to the political instability assess-
ment. When running the corresponding regressions with PCH and PPCH as proxies
the qualitative results do by and large prevail. Whether political instability is captured
by elections resulting in a new Prime minister or party seems to be immaterial for
the empirical performance. In the regressions PPCH shows lower overall ¯t, though.
However, using PVU instead of CBI and governmental change, or replacing CBI by
TOR yield insigni¯cant point estimates for these variables. The paper also states that
relative volatility between short and long rate is increasing in independence and de-
creasing in political instability. Preliminary regressions give weak empirical support
for these conclusions, though.
In conclusion, a comparison of the present results with the results in Cukierman
et al. (1993) reveals that a combination of political instability and central bank
independence has a more tangible impact on bond yield and treasury bill rate volatility,
respectively, than if the e®ect of political instability is neglected. I consciously deal
with a longer sample period (because institutional variables are rather rigid across
time), which as a side-e®ect inevitably limits the number of countries. In general, the
variables in the present paper have higher signi¯cance and higher overall ¯t. However,
the explanatory power diminishes remarkably as the period length shrinks in the
pooled regressions, which is compatible with the results in Cukierman et al. Moreover,
contrary to their results I ¯nd that legal but not actual independence has a signi¯cant
e®ect on interest rate volatility, which probably hinges on the exclusion of developing
countries in my sample.
6. Conclusions
In the aftermath of recent implementations of quantitative in°ation targets, the paper
contributes to the recent literature on in°ation targeting and central banking by for-
malizing in a model the relation between economic-political institutions and economic
outcome. The paper examines the role of political instability and central bank inde-
22pendence for interest rate performance, and thus for credibility of explicit or implicit
in°ation targets. New empirical evidence on this matter is provided.
In the model the implemented explicit in°ation target is allowed to be time-
varying and stochastic with asymmetric information. The in°ation target is non-
conventionally used as a benchmark for the identi¯cation of central bank instrument
independence, conservatism of the policymaker (the government), and political in-
stability. The implemented in°ation target will be a mapping of the time-varying
political target onto the objective of the central bank, whose own target is assumed
to be constant. To what extent the objective of an in°ation target-conservative or in-
°ation target-liberal government prevails depends on the susceptibility of the central
bank to external instructions, its instrument independence.
The model generates an average in°ation which is decreasing in independence,
whereas average output is independent of central bank independence. In°ation vari-
ability and output variability decrease in independence. Because lower in°ation can
be achieved without increased output variability, independence has no real adverse ef-
fects. The prediction is in accordance with empirical evidence, but counter to Rogo®
(1985), whose independence measure, however, goes through the relative weight on
in°ation stabilization.
It is established that marked political instability and lack of central bank instru-
ment independence promote persistently high volatility in nominal interest rates, and
therefore are detrimental to credibility of future monetary policy. In particular, the
rational implication is that the marginal e®ect from less (more) instrument indepen-
dence on interest rate volatility is increasing (decreasing) in political instability. That
is, interest rate volatility increases more from less independence in countries with
conspicuous political instability. Absence of political turmoil fully subordinates the
consequence of independence. Mistrust in future monetary policy in terms of a wedge
between the claimed constant central bank in°ation target and the endogenous spot
and forward yield curves, over any forecast horizon, decreases with instrument inde-
pendence. Thus, independence determines how politically tinged is economic outcome.
Moreover, lower independence and increased political instability impede the conduct
of monetary policy, and imply an unfavorable relative volatility in short and long term
nominal interest rates.
A normative result is considered where strategic delegation of the explicit time-
varying in°ation target can achieve the second-best equilibrium if the government
selects a su±ciently low in°ation target. Thereby the in°ation bias is made void.
It is shown that the optimal target is time-invariant and thus closed to per-period
renegotiations. Because the initial delegation is succeeded by a monetary reform
which makes the central bank fully instrument, the legislative support is guaranteed.
The predictions are confronted with cross-country data in a subset of OECD coun-
tries over various sub-periods ranging from the early 1960s to 1989. The empirical
contribution of the paper is that it examines whether the interaction between political
instability and central bank independence a®ects long and short term nominal interest
23rate volatility, respectively. The results are supportive to the theoretical predictions.
In particular, the interacting proxy has conspicuous impact on bond yield volatility
during the periods considered. Bond yield volatility thus increases more from less
independence in countries with marked political instability than in politically stable
countries. The conclusion is that lack of credibility of future monetary policy, that is,
when expected in°ation embodied in nominal interest rates deviates from a constant
(explicit or implicit) central bank in°ation target can be explained by monetary and
political institutions identi¯ed as in the model.
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27A. Appendix
A.1. Optimal Losses of the Central Bank and Society under Commitment
Combining the discounted indirect loss function of the central bank with (3.10) and
Et¡1[´t!t] = ´t¡sEt¡1[!t] = ´t¡sEt¡1[´t] = 0 8s ¸ 1 yields µ2 = µ2±°2 and µ1 = µ1±°;
which hold only if
µ1 = µ2 = 0 for ±;° < 1: (A.1)




















Examining the optimal value of (2.1) of society yields
¹ µ2 =
(Ã ¡ 1)2°2
1 ¡ ±°2 ; ¹ µ1 =














with ¢ ´ ((Ã ¡ 1)2 + 2±¹ µ1 + ±¹ µ2¹ ¦)¹ ¦:
















which minimizes the optimal discounted loss of society.
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28where (4.1) has been repeatedly substituted into (2.10) and (2.8) for ¿ = 0;1;::;T¡t¡1
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where K > 0; and h and º0
t+1 are (3 £ 1) vectors.
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where ~ k =
°4
1¡°2Ã2; k1 is given in (3.9), and it+1 as previously is shorthand for it+1;t+2:
A.4. Data Description and Variable De¯nition
GCH ´ Governmental transition in the form of a change of cabinet irrespective of
whether the Prime minister leaves o±ce or not. GCH is self-constructed from existing
raw data and de¯ned by the number transitions divided by the number of years in the
sample period. Source: Lane et al. (1991).
PCH ´ Governmental transition in the form of Prime minister turnover without im-
plying a switch of party in o±ce. PCH is self-constructed from existing raw data
and de¯ned by the number transitions divided by the number of years in the sample
period. Source: Lane et al. (1991).
PPCH ´ Governmental transition in the form of switch of party in o±ce. PPCH is
self-constructed from existing raw data and de¯ned by the number transitions divided
by the number of years in the sample period. Source: Lane et al. (1991).
Central bank independence (CBI) ´ Legal central bank independence index in the
interval between zero and one. It is characterized by four groups of issues: the ap-
pointment, the term of o±ce, and the dismissal of the governor, the policy formulation
29procedure, the implementation of the price stability goal, and limitations on lending.
Source: Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
Turnover rate of central bank governor (TOR) ´ Actual central bank independence
in the interval between zero and 0.3. Source: Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992).
Political vulnerability of central banks (PVU) ´ Number of replacements of central
bank governor within six months following a political transition divided by the number
of political transitions for a given time period. Source: Cukierman and Webb (1995).
Short term interest rate: Treasury bills with three months to maturity; Frequency:
monthly observations (New Zealand, quarterly); Source: Bank of International Settle-
ments (BIS) (except for Denmark (International Financial Statistics (IFS)) and New
Zealand (Main Economic Indicators (MEI))).
Long term interest rate: Bonds with 5-10 years to maturity; Frequency: monthly
observations (New Zealand, quarterly); Source: BIS (except for Denmark, Ireland
(IFS), and New Zealand (MEI)).
A.5. The Sample of Countries
The country sample and the period are restricted by the availability of monthly obser-
vations on short and long term interest rate data. Only democratic industrial countries
(OECD) are included. The sample period starts for short rate (TB) and long rates





























































































Note: Standard errors based on an asymptotically consistent covariance
matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity within parenthesis. ***, **, *
denote signi¯cance at 1, 5, 10 % levels.












































Note: See Table (A.1). The covariance matrix is asymptotically
consistent allowing for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous
cross-country correlation.
Table A.2: Pooled cross-country OLS; 1966-1971, 1972-1979, 1980-1989; Dependent








































Note: See Table (A.2). Includes 17 (unreported) country
speci¯c dummy variables.
Table A.3: Pooled cross-country OLS; Fixed e®ect model; 1966-1971, 1972-1979, 1980-












































Note: See Table (A.1).












































Note: See Table (A.1).
Table A.5: Cross-country OLS; 1966-1989; Dependent variable: Treasury bill volatil-
ity.
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